The following excerpt listed below is reprinted here with permission. It is a very interesting article with some absolute gems when it comes to considering the cultural implications in any international dealings. It’s also very long and dry like most research. I would NOT recommend reading this baby unless you are committed to finishing it. Otherwise, make sure you sitting on a comfortable couch…… (I suggest printing this one and digesting it in small doses).
The pervasive impact of culture on international negotiations
The primary purpose of this section is to demonstrate the extent of cultural differences in negotiation styles and how these differences can cause problems in international business negotiations. The reader will note that national culture does not determine negotiation behavior. Rather, national culture is one of many factors that influence behavior at the negotiation table, albeit an important one. For example, gender, organizational culture, international experience, industry or regional background can all be important influences as well. Of course, stereotypes of all kinds are dangerous, and international negotiators must get to know the people they are working with, not just their culture, country, or company.
The material here is based on systematic study of international negotiation behavior over the last three decades in which the negotiation styles of more than 1,500 businesspeople in 17 countries (21 cultures) were considered. The work involved interviews with experienced executives and participant observations in the field, as well as behavioral science laboratory work including surveys and analyses of videotaped negotiations. The countries studied were Japan, S. Korea, China (Tianjin, Guangzhou, and Hong Kong), Vietnam, Taiwan, the Philippines, Russia, Israel, Norway, the Czech Republic, Germany, France, the United Kingdom, Spain, Brazil, Mexico, Canada (English-speakers and French-speakers), and the United States. The countries were chosen because they constitute America’s most important present and future trading partners.
Looking broadly across the several cultures, two important lessons stand out. The first is that regional generalizations very often are not correct. For example, Japanese and Korean negotiation styles are quite similar in some ways, but in other ways they could not be more different. The second lesson learned from the research is that Japan is an exceptional place: On almost every dimension of negotiation style considered, the Japanese are on or near the end of the scale. For example, the Japanese use the lowest amount of eye contact of the cultures studied. Sometimes, Americans are on the other end. But actually, most of the time Americans are somewhere in the middle. The reader will see this evinced in the data presented in this section. The Japanese approach, however, is most distinct, even sui generis.
Cultural differences cause four kinds of problems in international business negotiations, at the levels of:
- Nonverbal behaviors
- Thinking and decision-making processes
The order is important; the problems lower on the list are more serious because they are more subtle. For example, two negotiators would notice immediately if one were speaking Japanese and the other German. The solution to the problem may be as simple as hiring an interpreter or talking in a common third language, or it may be as difficult as learning a language. Regardless of the solution, the problem is obvious.
Cultural differences in nonverbal behaviors, on the other hand, are almost always hidden below our awareness. That is to say, in a face-to-face negotiation participants nonverbally—and more subtly—give off and take in a great deal of information. Some experts argue that this information is more important than verbal information. Almost all this signaling goes on below our levels of consciousness. When the nonverbal signals from foreign partners are different, negotiators are most apt to misinterpret them without even being conscious of the mistake. For example, when a French client consistently interrupts, Americans tend to feel uncomfortable without noticing exactly why. In this manner, interpersonal friction often colors business relationships, goes undetected, and, consequently, goes uncorrected. Differences in values and thinking and decision-making processes are hidden even deeper and therefore are even harder to diagnose and therefore cure. These differences are discussed below, starting with language and nonverbal behaviors.
Differences at the level of language
Translation problems are often substantial in international negotiations. And, when languages are linguistically distant, greater problems should be anticipated. Particularly daunting can be work in global negotiation. Often the language used is English, but it may be spoken as a second language by most executives at the table. Indeed, native speakers from England, India, and the United States often have trouble understanding one another. Exact translations in international interactions are a goal almost never attained.
Moreover, language differences are sometimes exploited in interesting ways. Many senior executives in foreign countries speak and understand some English, but prefer to speak in their “stronger” native language and use an interpreter. Thus, we’ve see a senior Russian negotiator asking questions in Russian. The interpreter then translated the question for his American counterpart. While the interpreter spoke, the American’s attention (gaze direction) was given to the interpreter. However, the Russian’s gaze direction was at the American. Therefore, the Russian could carefully and unobtrusively observe the American’s facial expressions and nonverbal responses. Additionally, when the American spoke, the senior Russian had twice the response time. Because he understood English, he could formulate his responses during the translation process.
What’s this extra response time worth in a strategic conversation? What’s it worth to be carefully able to observe the nonverbal responses of your top-level counterpart in a high-stakes business negotiation? Simply stated, bilingualism is not a common characteristic for Americans, and therefore competitors with greater language skills are afforded a natural advantage in international commerce.
Additionally, a common complaint heard from American managers regards foreign clients and partners breaking into side conversations in their native languages. At best, it is seen as impolite, and quite often American negotiators are likely to attribute something sinister to the content of the foreign talk—“They’re plotting or telling secrets.” This is a frequent American mistake.
The usual purpose of such side conversations is to straighten out a translation problem. For instance, one Korean may lean over to another and ask, “What’d he say?” Or, the side conversation can regard a disagreement among the foreign team members. Both circumstances should be seen as positive signs by Americans—that is, getting translations straight enhances the efficiency of the interactions, and concessions often follow internal disagreements. But because most Americans speak only one language, neither circumstance is appreciated. By the way, people from other countries are advised to give Americans a brief explanation of the content of their first few side conversations to assuage the sinister attributions.
But, there are problems at the level of language beyond translations and interpreters. Data from simulated negotiations are informative. In the study, the verbal behaviors of negotiators in 15 of the cultures (six negotiators in each of the 15 groups) were videotaped. The numbers in the body of Exhibit 1 represent the percentages of statements that were classified into each category listed. That is, 7 percent of the statements made by Japanese negotiators were classified as promises, 4 percent as threats, 7 percent as recommendations, and so on. The verbal bargaining behaviors used by the negotiators during the simulations proved to be surprisingly similar across cultures. Negotiations in all 15 cultures were composed primarily of information-exchange tactics—questions and self-disclosures. Note that the Israelis are on the low end of the continuum of self-disclosures. Their 30 percent (near the Japanese, Spaniards, and the English-speaking Canadians at 34 percent) was the lowest across all 15 groups, suggesting that they are the most reticent about giving (that is, communicating) information. Overall, however, the patterns of verbal tactics used were surprisingly similar across the diverse cultures.
Go to Exhibit 1, Verbal Negotiation Tactics, (the “what” of communications) across 15 Cultures: 
Anthropologist Ray L. Birdwhistell demonstrated that less than 35% of the message in conversations is conveyed by the spoken word while the other 65% is communicated nonverbally. Albert Mehrabian, a UCLA psychologist, also parsed where meaning comes from in face-to-face interactions. He reports:
- 7% of the meaning is derived from the words spoken
- 38% from paralinguistic channels, that is, tone of voice, loudness, and other aspects of how things are said
- 55% from facial expressions
Of course, some might quibble with the exact percentages (and many have), but our work also supports the notion that nonverbal behaviors are crucial – how things are said is often more important than what is said.
Exhibit 2 provides analyses of some linguistic aspects and nonverbal behaviors for the 15 videotaped groups, that is, how things are said. Although these efforts merely scratch the surface of these kinds of behavioral analyses, they still provide indications of substantial cultural differences. Note that, once again, the Japanese are at or next to the end of the continuum on almost every dimension of the behaviors listed. Their facial gazing and touching are the least among the 15 groups. Only the Northern Chinese used the word no less frequently, and only the Russians used more silent periods than did the Japanese.
Go to Exhibit 2, Linguistic Aspects of Language and Nonverbal Behaviors (“how” things are said) across 15 Cultures: 
A broader examination of the data in Exhibits 1 and 2 reveals a more meaningful conclusion: The variation across cultures is greater when comparing linguistic aspects of language and nonverbal behaviors than when the verbal content of negotiations is considered. For example, notice the great differences between the Japanese and Brazilians in Exhibit 1 vis-à-vis Exhibit 2.
Distinctive negotiation behaviors of 15 cultural groups
Following are further descriptions of the distinctive aspects of each of the 15 cultural groups videotaped. Certainly, conclusions of statistical significant differences between individual cultures cannot be drawn without larger sample sizes. But, the suggested cultural differences are worthwhile to consider briefly.
Japan. Consistent with most descriptions of Japanese negotiation behavior, the results of this analysis suggest their style of interaction is among the least aggressive (or most polite). Threats, commands, and warnings appear to be de-emphasized in favor of the more positive promises, recommendations, and commitments. Particularly indicative of their polite conversational style was their infrequent use of no and you and facial gazing, as well as more frequent silent periods.
Korea. Perhaps one of the more interesting aspects of the analysis is the contrast of the Asian styles of negotiations. Non-Asians often generalize about the Orient; the findings demonstrate, however, that this is a mistake. Korean negotiators used considerably more punishments and commands than did the Japanese. Koreans used the word no and interrupted more than three times as frequently as the Japanese. Moreover, no silent periods occurred between Korean negotiators.
China (Northern). The behaviors of the negotiators from Northern China (i.e., in and around Tianjin) were most remarkable in the emphasis on asking questions (34 percent). Indeed, 70 percent of the statements made by the Chinese negotiators were classified as information-exchange tactics. Other aspects of their behavior were quite similar to the Japanese, particularly the use of no and you and silent periods.
Taiwan. The behavior of the businesspeople in Taiwan was quite different from that in China and Japan but similar to that in Korea. The Chinese on Taiwan were exceptional in the time of facial gazing—on the average, almost 20 of 30 minutes. They asked fewer questions and provided more information (self-disclosures) than did any of the other Asian groups.
Russia. The Russians’ style was quite different from that of any other European group, and, indeed, was quite similar in many respects to the style of the Japanese. They used no and you infrequently and used the most silent periods of any group. Only the Japanese did less facial gazing, and only the Chinese asked a greater percentage of questions.
Israel. The behaviors of the Israeli negotiators were distinctive in three respects. As mentioned above, they used the lowest percentage of self-disclosures, apparently holding their cards relatively closely. Alternatively, they used by far the highest percentages of promises and recommendations, using these persuasive strategies unusually heavily. They were also at the end of the scale on the percentage of normative appeals at 5 percent with the most frequent reference to competitors’ offers. Perhaps most importantly the Israeli negotiators interrupted one another much more frequently than negotiators from any other group. Indeed, this important nonverbal behavior is most likely to blame for the “pushy” stereotype often used by Americans to describe their Israeli negotiation partners.
Germany. The behaviors of the Germans are difficult to characterize because they fell toward the center of almost all the continua. However, the Germans were exceptional in the high percentage of self-disclosures (47 percent) and the low percentage of questions (11 percent).
United Kingdom. The behaviors of the British negotiators were remarkably similar to those of the Americans in all respects. Most British negotiators have a strong sense of the right way to negotiate and the wrong. Protocol is of great importance.
Spain. Diga is perhaps a good metaphor for the Spanish approach to negotiations evinced in our data. When you make a phone call in Madrid, the usual greeting on the other end is not hola (“hello”) but is, instead, diga (“speak”). It is not surprising, then, that the Spaniards in the videotaped negotiations likewise used the highest percentage of commands (17 percent) of any of the groups and gave comparatively little information (self-disclosures, only 34 percent). Moreover, they interrupted one another more frequently than any other group, and they used the terms no and you very frequently.
France. The style of the French negotiators was perhaps the most aggressive of all the groups. In particular, they used the highest percentage of threats and warnings (together, 8 percent). They also used interruptions, facial gazing, and no and you very frequently compared with the other groups, and one of the French negotiators touched his partner on the arm during the simulation.
Brazil. The Brazilian businesspeople, like the French and Spanish, were quite aggressive. They used the second-highest percentage of commands of all the groups. On average, the Brazilians said the word no 42 times, you 90 times, and touched one another on the arm about 5 times during 30 minutes of negotiation. Facial gazing was also high.
Mexico. The patterns of Mexican behavior in our negotiations are good reminders of the dangers of regional or language-group generalizations. Both verbal and nonverbal behaviors were quite different than those of their Latin American (Brazilian) or continental (Spanish) cousins. Indeed, Mexicans answer the telephone with the much less demanding bueno (short for “good day”). In many respects, the Mexican behavior was very similar to that of the negotiators from the United States.
French-Speaking Canada. The French-speaking Canadians behaved quite similarly to their continental cousins. Like the negotiators from France, they too used high percentages of threats and warnings, and even more interruptions and eye contact. Such an aggressive interaction style would not mix well with some of the more low-key styles of some of the Asian groups or with English speakers, including English-speaking Canadians.
English-Speaking Canada. The Canadians who speak English as their first language used the lowest percentage of aggressive persuasive tactics (threats, warnings, and punishments totaled only 1 percent) of all 15 groups. Perhaps, as communications researchers suggest, such stylistic differences are the seeds of interethnic discord as witnessed in Canada over the years. With respect to international negotiations, the English-speaking Canadians used noticeably more interruptions and no’s than negotiators from either of Canada’s major trading partners, the United States and Japan.
United States. Like the Germans and the British, the Americans fell in the middle of most continua. They did interrupt one another less frequently than all the others, but that was their sole distinction.
These differences across the cultures are quite complex, and this material by itself should not be used to predict the behaviors of foreign counterparts. Instead, great care should be taken with respect to the aforementioned dangers of stereotypes. The key here is to be aware of these kinds of differences so that the Japanese silence, the Brazilian “no, no, no…,” or the French threat are not misinterpreted.
In addition to the 15 cultures which have been discussed; below is an excerpt on negotiation approaches within the Mediterranean.
“The Mediterranean culture is altogether warmer.
Warm greetings and social aspects. Exuberant uses of postures and gestures. difficulty in pinning discussions down to particular deals or particular phases of negotiation.
In some regions, deals need to be ‘lubricated’. Indeed, this question of ‘lubrication’ is central to the cultures of some Mediterranean countries. It is seen as a normal practice and does not have the repulsive character of ‘bribery’.
The approach to negotiation in these cultures needs to retain the types of discipline we have been discussing; and yet to be conscious of the need for lubrication. Since no respectable western company would wish to be associated with the practice of bribery, the need is to secure a local agency and to ensure that that agency handles the lubrication.”
Differences in managerial values as pertinent to negotiations
Four managerial values—objectivity, competitiveness, equality, and punctuality—that are held strongly and deeply by most Americans seem to frequently cause misunderstandings and bad feelings in international business negotiations.
“Americans make decisions based upon the bottom line and on cold, hard facts.” “Americans don’t play favorites.” “Economics and performance count, not people.” “Business is business.” Such statements well reflect American notions of the importance of objectivity.
The single most successful book on the topic of negotiation, Getting to Yes, is highly recommended for both American and foreign readers. The latter will learn not only about negotiations but, perhaps more important, about how Americans think about negotiations. The authors are quite emphatic about “separating the people from the problem,” and they state, “Every negotiator has two kinds of interests: in the substance and in the relationship.” This advice is probably quite worthwhile in the United States or perhaps in Germany, but in most places in the world such advice is nonsense. In most places in the world, particularly in collectivistic, high-context cultures, personalities and substance are not separate issues and cannot be made so.
For example, consider how important nepotism is in Chinese or Hispanic cultures. Experts tell us that businesses don’t grow beyond the bounds and bonds of tight family control in the burgeoning “Chinese commonwealth.” Things work the same way in Spain, Mexico, and the Philippines. And, naturally, negotiators from such countries not only will take things personally but will be personally affected by negotiation outcomes.[clarification needed] What happens to them at the negotiation table will affect the business relationship regardless of the economics involved.
Competitiveness and Equality
Simulated negotiations can be viewed as a kind of experimental economics wherein the values of each participating cultural group are roughly reflected in the economic outcomes. The simple simulation used in this part of our work represents the essence of commercial negotiations—it has both competitive and cooperative aspects. At least 40 businesspeople from each culture played the same buyer-seller game, negotiating over the prices of three products. Depending on the agreement reached, the “negotiation pie” could be made larger through cooperation (as high as $10,400 in joint profits) before it was divided between the buyer and seller. The results are summarized in Exhibit 3.
Go to Exhibit 3, Cultural Differences in Competitiveness and Equality in Negotiation Outcomes across 20 Cultures: 
The Japanese were the champions at making the pie big. Their joint profits in the simulation were the highest (at $9,590) among the 21 cultural groups involved. The Chinese in Hong Kong and the British businesspeople also behaved cooperatively in our negotiation game. The Czechs and the Germans behaved more competitively. The American pie was more average sized (at $9,030), but at least it was divided relatively equitably (51.8 percent of the profits went to the buyers). Conversely, the Japanese, and particularly the South Korean, Mexican businesspeople split their pies in strange (perhaps even unfair) ways, with buyers making higher percentages of the profits (53.8 percent, 55.0 percent, and 56.7 percent, respectively). The implications of these simulated business negotiations are completely consistent with the comments of other authors and the adage that in Japan (and apparently in Korea and Meixco as well) the buyer is “kinger”. Americans have little understanding of the Japanese practice of granting complete deference to the needs and wishes of buyers. That is not the way things work in America. American sellers tend to treat American buyers more as equals, and the egalitarian values of American society support this behavior. The American emphasis on competition and individualism represented in these findings is quite consistent with the work of Geert Hofstede, which indicated that Americans scored the highest among all the cultural groups on the individualism (versus collectivism) scale. Moreover, values for individualism/collectivism have been shown to directly influence negotiation behaviors in several other countries.
Finally, not only do Japanese buyers achieve higher results than American buyers, but compared with American sellers ($4,350), Japanese sellers also get more of the commercial pie ($4,430) as well. Interestingly, when shown these results, Americans in executive seminars still often prefer the American seller’s role. In other words, even though the American sellers make lower profits than the Japanese, many American managers apparently prefer lower profits if those profits are yielded from a more equal split of the joint profits.
“Just make them wait.” Everyone else in the world knows that no negotiation tactic is more useful with Americans, because no one places more value on time, no one has less patience when things slow down, and no one looks at their wristwatches more than Americans do. Edward T. Hall in his seminal writing is best at explaining how the passage of time is viewed differently across cultures and how these differences most often hurt Americans.
Even Americans try to manipulate time to their advantage, however. As a case in point, Solar Turbines Incorporated (a division of Caterpillar) once sold $34 million worth of industrial gas turbines and compressors for a Russian natural gas pipeline project. Both parties agreed that final negotiations would be held in a neutral location, the south of France. In previous negotiations, the Russians had been tough but reasonable. But in Nice, the Russians were not nice. They became tougher and, in fact, completely unreasonable, according to the Solar executives involved.
It took a couple of discouraging days before the Americans diagnosed the problem, but once they did, a crucial call was made back to headquarters in San Diego. Why had the Russians turned so cold? They were enjoying the warm weather in Nice and weren’t interested in making a quick deal and heading back to Moscow! The call to California was the key event in this negotiation. Solar’s headquarters people in San Diego were sophisticated enough to allow their negotiators to take their time. From that point on, the routine of the negotiations changed to brief, 45-minute meetings in the mornings, with afternoons at the golf course, beach, or hotel, making calls and doing paperwork. Finally, during the fourth week, the Russians began to make concessions and to ask for longer meetings. Why? They could not go back to Moscow after four weeks on the Mediterranean without a signed contract. This strategic reversal of the time pressure yielded a wonderful contract for Solar.
Differences in thinking and decision-making processes
When faced with a complex negotiation task, most Westerners (notice the generalization here) divide the large task up into a series of smaller tasks. Issues such as prices, delivery, warranty, and service contracts may be settled one issue at a time, with the final agreement being the sum of the sequence of smaller agreements. In Asia, however, a different approach is more often taken wherein all the issues are discussed at once, in no apparent order, and concessions are made on all issues at the end of the discussion. The Western sequential approach and the Eastern holistic approach do not mix well.
That is, American managers often report great difficulties in measuring progress in negotiations, particularly in Asian countries. After all, in America, you are half done when half the issues are settled. But in China, Japan, or Korea nothing seems to get settled. Then, surprise, you are done. Often, Americans make unnecessary concessions right before agreements are announced by the other side. For example, one American department store executive traveling to Japan to buy six different consumer products for her chain lamented that negotiations for the first product took an entire week. In the United States, such a purchase would be consummated in an afternoon. So, by her calculations, she expected to have to spend six weeks in Japan to complete her purchases. She considered raising her purchase prices to try to move things along faster. But before she was able to make such a concession, the Japanese quickly agreed on the other five products in just three days. This particular manager was, by her own admission, lucky in her first encounter with Japanese bargainers.
This American executive’s near blunder reflects more than just a difference in decision-making style. To Americans, a business negotiation is a problem-solving activity, the best deal for both parties being the solution. To a Japanese businessperson, on the other hand, a business negotiation is a time to develop a business relationship with the goal of long-term mutual benefit. The economic issues are the context, not the content, of the talks. Thus, settling any one issue really is not that important. Such details will take care of themselves once a viable, harmonious business relationship is established. And, as happened in the case of the retail goods buyer above, once the relationship was established—signaled by the first agreement—the other “details” were settled quickly.
American bargainers should anticipate such a holistic approach to be common in Asian cultures and be prepared to discuss all issues simultaneously and in an apparently haphazard order. Progress in the talks should not be measured by how many issues have been settled. Rather, Americans must try to gauge the quality of the business relationship. Important signals of progress can be the following:
- Higher-level executives from the other side being included in the discussions
- Their questions beginning to focus on specific areas of the deal
- A softening of their attitudes and position on some of the issues—“Let us take some time to study this issue”
- At the negotiation table, increased talk among themselves in their own language, which may often mean they’re trying to decide something
- Increased bargaining and use of the lower-level, informal, and other channels of communication
Implications for managers and negotiators
Considering all the potential problems in cross-cultural negotiations, particularly when you mix managers from relationship-oriented cultures with those from information-oriented ones, it is a wonder that any international business gets done at all. Obviously, the economic imperatives of global trade make much of it happen despite the potential pitfalls. But an appreciation of cultural differences can lead to even better international commercial transactions—it is not just business deals but creative and highly profitable business relationships that are the real goal of international business negotiations.
- ^ Copyright (c) 2009 John L. Graham. Permission is granted to copy, distribute and/or modify this document under the terms of the GNU Free Documentation License, Version 1.2 or any later version published by the Free Software Foundation; with no Invariant Sections, no Front-Cover Texts, and no Back-Cover Texts. A copy of the license is included in the last section below entitled “GNU Free Documentation License”.
- ^ a b Seidner, Stanley S. (1991), Negative Affect Arousal Reactions from Mexican and Puerto Rican Respondents, Washington, D.C.: ERIC, ISBN ED346711 http://www.eric.ed.gov/ERICWebPortal/custom/portlets/recordDetails/detailmini.jsp?_nfpb=true&_&ERICExtSearch_SearchValue_0=ED346711&ERICExtSearch_SearchType_0=no&accno=ED346711
- ^ See William Hernandez Requejo and John L. Graham, Global Negotiation: The New Rules, New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2008, Chapter 5 for an extensive discussion of such factors; also see 
- ^ John L. Graham, “The Japanese Negotiation Style: Characteristics of a Distinct Approach,” Negotiation Journal, April 1993, 123-140
- ^ William Hernandez Requejo and John L. Graham, Global Negotiation: The New Rules, New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2008
- ^ John L. Graham, Cross-Cultural Sales Negotiations: A Multilevel Analysis, dissertation University of California, Berkeley, 1980
- ^ For a complete discussion of the concept of “linguistic distance” please see Joel West and John L. Graham, “A Linguistics-Based Measure of Cultural Distance and Its Relationship to Managerial Values,” Management International Review, 2004, 4(3), 239-260.
- ^ Graham and his colleagues have completed similar sorts of content analyses with 60 Americans and 52 Russian negotiators and the correspondence of the findings between the larger and smaller sample sizes is great (r > 0.9, p < 0.05), see C. Roemer, J. Neu, P. Garb, and J.L. Graham, “A Comparison of Russian and American Negotiation Behaviors,” Journal of International Negotiation, 1999(4), pages 1-25.
- ^ Roger O. Crockett, “The 21st Century Meeting,” BusinessWeek, February 26, 2007, pages 72-80.
- ^ Albert Mehrabian, Silent Messages: Implicit Communication of Emotions and Attitudes (2nd edition, Belmont, CA: Wadsworth, 1980).
- ^ Scott, Bill. The Skills of Negotiating. New York City: John Wiley & Sons, 1981. Print.
- ^ Roger Fisher, William Ury, and Bruce Patton, Getting to Yes: Negotiating Agreement without Giving In (New York: Penguin, 1991).
- ^ John L. Graham, Alma Mintu-Wimsatt, and Wayne Rodgers, “Explorations of Negotiation Behaviors in Ten Foreign Cultures Using a Model Developed in the United States,” Management Science, January 1994, 72-95.
- ^ Geert Hofstede, Cultures Consequences (2nd edition, Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage, 2001).
- ^ Edward T. Hall, The Silent Language (New York: Doubleday, 1959), The Hidden Dimension (New York: Doubleday, 1966), and Beyond Culture (New York: Anchor, 1981).
- ^ N. Mark Lam and John L. Graham, China Now: Doing Business in the World’s Most Dynamic Market, New York: McGraw-Hill, 2007
- ^ James Day Hodgson, Yoshihiro Sano, and John L. Graham, Doing Business in the New Japan, Boulder, CO: Rowman & Littlfield, 2008.
- ^ See Philip R. Cateora, Mary C. Gilly, and John L. Graham, International Marketing (14th edition, McGraw-Hill, 2009), Chapter 5 for a description of the distinction between information-oriented and relationship-oriented cultures.
- ^ See  for information about negotiation styles in 50 countries. Several excellent books have been published on the topic of international business negotiations. Among them are Lothar Katz, Negotiating International Business and Principles of Negotiating International Business (both Charleston, SC: Booksurge LLC, 2008); Camille Schuster and Michael Copeland, Global Business, Planning for Sales and Negotiations (Fort Worth, TX: Dryden, 1996); Robert T. Moran and William G. Stripp, Dynamics of Successful International Business Negotiations (Houston: Gulf, 1991); Pervez Ghauri and Jean-Claude Usunier (eds.), International Business Negotiations (Oxford: Pergamon, 1996); Donald W. Hendon, Rebecca Angeles Hendon, and Paul Herbig, Cross-Cultural Business Negotiations (Westport, CT: Quorum, 1996); Sheida Hodge, Global Smarts (New York: Wiley, 2000); Jeswald W. Salacuse, Making, Managing, and Mending Deals around the World in the 21st Century (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2003); Michelle Gelfand and Jeanne Brett (eds.), The Handbook of Negotiation and Culture (Stanford, CA: Stanford Business Books, 2004); and Jeanne M. Brett, Negotiating Globally (San Francisco: Jossey-Bass, 2001). In addition, Roy J. Lewicki, David M. Saunders, and John W. Minton’s, Negotiation: Readings, Exercises, and Cases, 3rd ed. (New York: Irwin/McGraw-Hill, 1999), is an important book on the broader topic of business negotiations. The material from this chapter draws extensively on William Hernandez Requejo and John L. Graham, Global Negotiation: The New Rules (New York: Palgrave
- ^ Howard Raiffa with John Richardson and David Metcalfe, Negotiation Analysis, Cambridge, MA: Belknap, 2002
- ^ Roger Fisher and William Ury, Getting to Yes, New York: Penguin, 1981